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and Senator MacDonald, of Indiana, are attributed to Louisiana (pp. 131, 166), while Randolph is assigned to Michigan (p. 100), and Bland, of Missouri, to Mississippi (p. 132). . These and similar slips are easily remedied. On the whole the volume deserves to be recognized as one with a distinct and worthy purpose that has been well executed.

JAMES ALBERT WOODBURN.

Spanish-American Diplomatic Relations Preceding the War of 1898.

By HORACE EDGAR FLACK. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. 1906. Pp. 95.)

This monograph by Dr. Flack is an outgrowth of work done in the seminar of political science at the Johns Hopkins University. The method of the writer is to state the principles of international law bearing upon the subject to be considered, and thereby to test the theory and practice of the United States during the late Cuban insurrection. The most valuable portion is the treatment of the obligation of neutrals toward a conflict where the midway status of insurgency has been accorded and belligerency denied. The frequent insurrections in Spanish-America of a minor character, undeserving of the rank of belligerency, make absolutely imperative a clearer notion of the relative rights and obligations of insurgents, parent States and neutrals. Toward this end the restatement of the author has helped. He, however, defends a doctrine of neutral obligation to suppress the so-called juntas and filibustering which throws a greater burden on neutrals than English and American writers have been willing to admit. In this, as in several other particulars, Dr. Flack has been inclined to follow the continental authorities on international law. The United States government stood committed to a degree of vigilance in the suppression of filibustering which would make engagement in it a dangerous business, but denied that the obligations of neutrality required more, or that the belligerents could shift the burden of suppression from themselves to neutrals. In truth usage in the matter of what aid neutral subjects may lawfully give to belligerents with whom they sympathize lags behind the strict theory of neutral conduct. This is particularly true in the practice of the United States where there exists a predisposition to sympathize with revolutionists.

The chapter on intervention, which is termed the main subject of

the book, finds against the United States on every technical ground for intervention which the president and congress advanced. This conclusion was the logical deduction from the application of rules devised originally to reduce to a minimum the occasions for interference with the sovereign right of each State to work out the solution of its own internal affairs. Jurists generally recognize that there are extraordinary and exceptional cases which cannot be brought within the ordinary rules of international law. Dr. Flack with this in mind admits the possibility of a moral ground for intervention as valid, though not legal, if the United States exhausted every diplomatic means of accomplishing its object, and a final chapter deals with the efforts put forth by Spain to avoid war. He is convinced that had the United States met every concession of Spain in a conciliatory spirit, war might have been avoided. The most severe criticism upon this view is that it accepts diplomatic representations at their face value; that it ignores a century of experience with Spanish attempts at governing colonies; and that it neglects the more important consideration that the concessions proposed by Spain had not been accepted by the insurgents nor was there any likelihood that they would ever accept them. Any plan for a settlement, however satisfactory to the United States and Spain, was no settlement in fact until it comprised the third party. The main issue with Spain was never in reality the Maine indemnity, however confused the public mind may have been, nor was it the settlement of the claims of American citizens against Spain. It was the termination of the war in Cuba.

Though there is an opportunity for a difference of opinion upon some of the conclusions this does not detract from the real value of the work as a scholarly statement of the principles of international law that ought to govern a State in its conduct as a neutral, and as a critical review of the public acts and declarations of the United States on the only occasion in nearly a century's time in which it was really tested as a neutral.

ELBERT J. BENTON.

Early Diplomatic Negotiations of the United States with Russia. By JOHN C. HILDT. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. 1906. Pp. 195.)

The university study under this title is a product of the seminar in history at the Johns Hopkins University, and presents the origin of